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THE JURY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
CONFERENCE
INTRODUCTION*
Susan N. Hermant & Lawrence M. Solant
Lawyers are trained in a system where the governing
principle is stare decisis, a backward-looking doctrine applied
in what appears to be a closed universe of statutory and case
law. With their gaze so directed, perhaps it should not be
surprising that lawyers and judges are not frequently inclined
to look ahead, or to look around at the work of scholars in other
disciplines as a catalyst for changing the law.
This conference, held on October 6, 2000, and co-
sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and Brooklyn
Law School's Center for the Study of Law, Language, and
Cognition,' has its roots in the recognition that many of the
©2001 Susan N. Herman & Lawrence M. Solan. All Rights Reserved.
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legal system's bedrock assumptions underlying one key legal
institution-the jury-are increasingly subject to challenge in
light of significant advances in fields like linguistics and
psychology. The law assumes, for example, that juries can and
will follow judges' carefully drafted legal instructions and then
apply the legal elements, as charged, to the facts they have
gleaned from the evidence. But do juries actually understand
legal instructions, with all their complexity, prolixity, and
legalistic language? To the extent that they do not, is the
problem a matter of linguistic clarity, or are legal concepts too
complex for jurors to grasp through instructions however they
are worded?2 Do jurors actually decide cases by discussing the
elements of the plaintiffs or prosecutor's case, or do they
employ other means of decision making that the law disdains?
The law also assumes that the jury selection process of voir
dire and challenges will winnow out prospective jurors who are
not "impartial." But is "impartiality," as the law defines it, an
unachievable ideal? Are there better means of identifying and
counteracting juror bias than the ones the law currently
employs?
Drawing together a roster of experts, from practice as
well as from academia, and from many different fields, this
conference promoted a dialogue that is continued in the papers
published in this volume. The central theme of the symposium,
and of this collection of papers, is whether the law governing
juries is based on outmoded assumptions that social scientists
can help to identify, and if so, whether we can do better in
selecting and communicating with jurors and prospective
jurors, and in defining the role the jury is to play. In keeping
with the goals of the National Institute of Justice in co-
Law, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 67 (1999); Roundtable: The Cognitive Bases of Gender Bias, 65
BROOK L. REv. 1037 (2000) (containing an article with that title by Virginia Valian,
and contributions by Marianne LaFrance, Marc R. Poirier and Elizabeth M.
Schneider).
2 This distinction is not a mere abstraction. In Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305
(7th Cir. 1993), Judge Easterbrook rejected empirical evidence that jurors were likely
to have misunderstood the death penalty instructions, in part, because the study did
not demonstrate that better drafted instructions would have made a difference. Serial
killer John Wayne Gacy was subsequently executed. See also Ursula Bentele &
William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation
Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROoK. L. REv. 1011 (2001); Peter
Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury
Instructions, 66 BROOK- L. REV. 1081 (2001).
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sponsoring the conference, another theme addressed by
individual presenters and by audience members was what
further studies social scientists might conduct that would
provide information of significance to the law. Although there
is considerable scholarly literature available on a subject like
jury nullification, for example, panelists and other participants
identified a number of unanswered questions that empirical
studies could usefully address. Future studies, like the papers
in this issue, can fuel renewed and more informed debate
within the law on the wide variety of topics addressed.
The first and second panels in the symposium reflected
a tension in the already existing scholarly literature. On the
one hand, a growing body of work has shown that jurors do not
think in terms of the legal categories upon which the system
depends. On the other hand, fine tuning instructions and
procedures as if jurors did think that way routinely produces
positive results. Included in this volume are two articles from
each of these panels.
The first panel, entitled, "Jurors and Cognition: How
Do Jurors Really Make Decisions?" confronted a gap, reflected
in the psychological and legal literature during the past two
decades, between the ways in which the system is designed to
help jurors make decisions and the ways in which jurors
actually make decisions. In theory, jurors evaluate evidence
and make decisions about the facts of a case based on a
rational assessment of that evidence. Jurors then reach a
verdict based on how well the facts that they found fit the
elements of the crime or civil claim, as reflected in the jury
charge that the judge reads.
In practice, however, this is not what jurors do. The
seminal work challenging the law's traditional assumptions
about juror cognition is Hastie, Pennington and Penrod's 1983
book, Inside the Jury! Two of these three authors,
psychologists Reid Hastie and Steven Penrod, presented papers
in the first panel of the symposium. Professor Hastie has
contributed an article to this volume. A second paper, by
Ursula Bentele and William J. Bowers, also published here,
deals with jurors in death penalty cases, presenting an
analysis of interviews with jurors who had sat on panels that
REID HASTIE ETAL., INSIDE THE JuRY (1983).
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had voted for the death penalty. Professor Penrod's conference
presentation focused largely on the psychological reasons for
jurors' failure to make decisions according to legal formulas,
especially in death penalty cases, elaborating on the themes of
the two articles from the first panel that appear in this volume.
In previous publications, Hastie and his colleagues
have espoused what they call the Story Model of juror decision
making. According to this model, jurors form stories of the
underlying events of a case, build their story as the evidence
accumulates, and then match the story they have constructed
against the crime or other legal breach that is the subject of
the litigation. Experimentation has shown that jurors'
decisions are in large part a function of the story that they
have adopted. In the O.J. Simpson case, for example, jurors
accepted the defense's tale of racism and police corruption,
rejecting the prosecutor's story that Simpson murdered two
innocent people.
To the experienced trial lawyer, Hastie's approach no
doubt rings true. Lawyers are generally aware that it is very
difficult to win a case by cross-examining the opposing
witnesses without an effort to construct for the jurors an
independent story of one's own. Simpson's skilled counsel
certainly knew that, and did not rely solely on the holes that
they had punched in the government's case. Law reports are
full of cases in which the defense failed to realize that jury
persuasion is a matter of convincing the jurors that one side
has told the more convincing tale. In the criminal context, it is
not unusual for a defendant to choose not to testify, perhaps
because he has prior convictions that would be brought to light
only if he did. If that defendant cannot, through other
witnesses, create a version of the facts at odds with the
government's, he will be at a serious disadvantage during
deliberations, if the Story Model is correct. In civil cases,
defendants often do not put on their own damages cases,
fearing that it will appear to the jury that they have conceded
liability. For example, in a widely reported case, Texaco v.
4 See Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories:
Behavioral Scientists' Reflections on the People of the State of California v. Orenthal
James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 957 (1996).
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Pennzoil Co.,5 Pennzoil had used experts to argue that Texaco's
tortious interference with its attempted takeover of Getty Oil
resulted in damages of $7.5 billion. The number was subject to
attack, and Texaco's lawyers did a fine job demonstrating the
theory's flaws. But Texaco did not put on experts to tell its own
story. The result was that the jury accepted Pennzoil's story-
damages and all.
To the extent that Hastie and his colleagues are
correct, then, jurors do not simply keep a tally of the evidence
and later use it to determine whether the government has
proven every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rather, jurors apply the law to the narratives that they have
created. But these narratives do not contain all the evidence.
To the contrary, they are constructed selectively to create a
picture of the events. Moreover, once a narrative is formed, it is
difficult to dislodge it, absent a competing, more compelling
one. This creates an advantage for the side that presents its
case first, as legal scholars have recognized.6
Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, Hastie's contribution to
this volume, adds a set of issues to the study of juror decision
making that have not yet been explored systematically in the
literature on the jury system: the role of emotions. The role of
emotions in legal reasoning has, however, begun to receive
attention in other contexts. For example, a recent collection of
essays edited by Susan Bandes explores ways in which both
rationality and emotion are embedded in our notions of crime
and punishment.7 In this article, Hastie points out that
emotions may play several roles in the process of jury
deliberation. Only some of these roles can even arguably be in
tune with the legal process as it is generally conceptualized.
For example, Hastie discusses psychological studies that show
people judging things differently depending on an emotional
state of mind caused by factors completely independent of the
decision-making process. Put simply, people are likely to judge
things more harshly when they are in a bad mood. What might
put jurors in a foul humor? Just about anything, from having
729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987).
See, e.g., BERNARD S. JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN LAW: LINGUISTIC,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVES (1995).
7 THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
20011
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
to sit and wait for hours while on jury duty, to disappointment
with a child's report card, to a depressing story on the news.
The jury literature is devoid of any analysis of how such factors
influence the process, and what might be done about it.
Hastie's article suggests significant avenues for future
research.
Hastie writes only briefly about the relationship
between decision making and emotional reaction to the
particular crimes and events that are the subject of the
litigation. This issue has been the province of the legal
literature on crime and punishment, with recent articles by
such scholars as Dan Kahan8 and Richard Posner.9 Instead,
Hastie focuses on what he calls "anticipatory emotions," the
emotional state that a juror at the time of a decision believes
that he or she will later experience as the result of having
made that decision. Here again, Hastie's thinking raises
serious issues concerning a potential gap between the way we
conceptualize the jury system and the way it operates in
reality. A principal purpose for this Symposium was to bring
together legal theorists and thinkers in the social sciences and
linguistics to attempt to identify avenues for future
exploration. Hastie's article, especially when combined with
the current interest in the role of emotion in the substantive
law, does just that.
Ursula Bentele and William J. Bowers' article, How
Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation
Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, reports on and
analyzes interviews with jurors who had participated in capital
cases in which the jury had voted to impose the death penalty.
Bentele is a law professor, Bowers a criminologist. In death
penalty cases, juries first vote on whether the defendant is
guilty of a capital crime, and later, after a separate hearing
called the "penalty phase," decide whether to impose death or a
term of imprisonment. In most jurisdictions, the penalty phase
involves a discrete decision based on the jury's balancing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The jury must find
8 Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW, supra note 7, at 63.
9 Richard A. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW, supra note 7, at 309.
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aggravating circumstances in order to impose death, but need
not impose death even if such circumstances are present. The
jury is also required to consider mitigating circumstances,
which often concern the defendant's own history and subjects
not previously raised during the trial phase. A sentence of
death requires unanimity, whereas a lack of unanimity
automatically results in a sentence of life imprisonment.
Bentele and Bowers found that jurors' reports of their
reasoning in death penalty deliberations do not correspond
with the system's design. For one thing, many jurors believe,
despite having been instructed to the contrary, that the
defendant's guilt alone is a good enough reason to sentence him
to death. They report one juror as having said "We reviewed
the evidence. We looked at the evidence on the table. [Then] we
all took a vote."" This perspective was not unusual among
those who participated in the study. The authors also found
that jurors took aggravating factors far more seriously than
mitigating ones, and that a substantial number of jurors
incorrectly believed that upon a finding that aggravating
circumstances were present, the death penalty was actually
required as a matter of law.
Bentele and Bowers employ Pennington and Hastie's
Story Model of jury deliberation as a partial explanation of
these facts.1 Having just voted to convict the defendant of the
crime, at the time that the penalty phase begins, jurors have in
mind the defendant's conduct as presented at trial. It would be
difficult, the authors argue, to dislodge this story of guilt in
favor of a second story that focuses on such things as the
defendant having been abused as a child.
Narrative theory further supports their position. For
example, Bernard Jackson notes that in any legal case there
are two stories: the story of the underlying events and the story
of the trial.2 Our legal system purports to keep these two
stories separate. But that does not mean that jurors can do so.
It may well be that the death penalty is not only a legal matter
for the trial and penalty phase, but is also perceived by jurors
10 Bentele & Bowers, supra note 2, at 1021.
" See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, in INSIDE THE JURY 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
12 See JACKSON, supra note 6.
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to be the final chapter in the story of the crime. The defendant
ruthlessly murdered someone, and then was put to death for
having done so. If that is the case, then jurors look at
themselves not only as decision makers in the story of the trial,
but as participants in the very story that they are supposed to
be judging dispassionately. By the same token, it makes sense
that jurors would focus more on aggravating circumstances
than on mitigating ones. Most aggravating circumstances
involve the manner in which the crime was committed, or
inferences about the defendant's likely dangerousness in the
future, which are partly based on the way in which the crime
was committed. Mitigating circumstances, in contrast, are
often about the defendant's background. To focus on
mitigation, a juror has to stop paying attention to the story of
the crime, whose final chapter has not yet been written, and
switch to the story of the defendant, whom the jurors have
already decided is a murderer.
Bentele and Bowers also provide some support for
Hastie's suggestions about the role of anticipatory emotions in
decision making. As mentioned previously, juror interviews
disclosed that many jurors believed that upon certain findings
of aggravating circumstances, the death penalty followed
automatically. To some extent, this reflects a mistake in their
understanding of the law, a fact to which we will return. But it
also reflects a desire to abrogate responsibility for a grizzly
task. One juror said in part: "The judge did that sentencing;
the jury only had to say [the defendant] was guilty of capital
murder."3 There are many other such remarks reported.
Bentele and Bowers also rely on other work in social
psychology to explain their results."' Obviously, these issues
are only beginning to receive the attention that they deserve.
Thus, not only do Bentele and Bowers complement Hastie's
work by instantiating it, but the two papers together suggest
fruitful possible areas of future research.
What about the jurors' own reports that they
frequently construed death penalty instructions as requiring a
death sentence when aggravating factors are present, even
though judges and lawyers have drafted instructions intended
13 Bentele & Bowers, supra note 2, at 1040.
14 See, e.g., IRVING JANIS, DECISION MAKING (1977).
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to tell the jurors that this is not the case? The jurors may have
had emotional reactions leading them to construe the
instructions incorrectly and to avoid taking responsibility for a
difficult decision. But to what extent can the law respond by
rewriting, clarifying, and strengthening the misunderstood
instructions to try to eliminate or at least lessen the
probability of misconstruction?
Such issues concerning the language of jury
instructions were part of the subject of the second panel of the
conference, "Jurors and Language: How Well Can We Expect
Jurors to Understand Their Assignments?" Participating in
this panel were Peter Tiersma, Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil
Vidmar, and Phoebe Ellsworth. Professor Ellsworth, who
teaches both law and psychology, has been a major contributor
to the literature concerning many aspects of the jury system,
including juror comprehension. 5 In her presentation at the
symposium, she shared some preliminary thoughts about the
possibility of having jurors in criminal cases participate in
sentencing more extensively than they do now.
Peter Tiersma's article, The Rocky Road to Legal
Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions,
addresses the comprehensibility of jury instructions. In fact,
Tiersma writes in detail about some of the same death penalty
cases mentioned by Bentele and Bowers." Tiersma is a law
professor with a background in linguistics, 7 and is a member of
the subcommittee of the California task force appointed to
make criminal jury instructions more comprehensible.
Among other things, Tiersma shows how the language
of some death penalty instructions concerning aggravating and
mitigating circumstances is easily misunderstood as requiring
the imposition of a death sentence whenever aggravating
factors are present.18 What is especially important about
', For recent work, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifinan, Juror
Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POLr. & L. 788 (2000).
16 See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
967 (1994).
1'7 Perhaps a disclosure is appropriate here. Peter M. Tiersma is co-writing a
book with one of the authors of this introduction, Lawrence Solan, who has a similar
background. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER TIERSMA, LANGUAGE ON TRIAL
(forthcoming 2002-2003).
18 See also Peter M. Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors
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Tiersma's article, however, is his concern about what should be
done to improve the system.
Much of Tiersma's article focuses on institutional
barriers to reforming jury instructions. And there are many.
Once a particular jury instruction becomes standardized, trial
courts are reluctant to risk reversal by permitting innovation,
even if the new instruction would improve on the old one. In
fact, a New York appellate judge recently stated in a
concurring opinion that trial courts should continue using the
standard reasonable doubt instruction, despite the fact that it
was poorly worded, on the rationale that uniformity in the
criminal justice system is an important value in itself.19
Moreover, as Tiersma points out, lawyers are frequently aware
of the importance of jury instructions generally, but not of the
nuances of their language. Thus, the issue of language is often
waived at trial and only surfaces during an appeal - too late
to be considered. One solution to this problem, adopted by
many states including New York and California, is for the
judiciary to appoint a commission to review jury instructions
and to suggest improvements prospectively. But these
commissions, too, are sometimes reluctant to recommend
changes that are significant enough to effect substantial
improvements.
Underlying Tiersma's article is the assumption that
the system can be improved by writing better instructions.
That is, to the extent that we would like to see jurors thinking
about the issues in a particular manner, we should tell them
just what we want them to do in ways that are most likely to
accomplish the system's stated goals. In fact, Shari Seidman
Diamond, a lawyer and psychologist, in collaboration with a
linguist, Judith Levi, did just that with the Illinois death
penalty instructions, with the result of substantially increased
juror comprehension of the concepts of aggravation and
mitigation.0
Yet, one might wonder why the instructions would
make much difference at all, given Hastie's Story Model of
Understand Mitigation?, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1.
19 People v. Redd, 266 A.D.2d 12, 12-13, 698 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215-17 (lst Dep't
1999) (Saxe, J., concurring).
20 Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death
by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996).
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decision making. Some psychologists believe that people think
in two different ways-in an associative manner, of the sort
that Hastie describes, and in a rule-like manner.21 It might be
argued that good instructions help jurors think in a rule-like
fashion where appropriate, breaking down their stories into the
various elements of an offense. Or alternatively, it might be
argued that good jury instructions steer jurors toward relying
upon legally relevant narratives. In either case, the empirical
literature on jury instructions is so robust that it is very
difficult to argue that improving the quality of jury instructions
is not a project worth taking seriously.
The article by Neil Vidmar and Shari Seidman
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, picks up on some of
these same themes. Vidmar and Diamond are both
psychologists who are members of law school faculties. Their
article cites research showing that people can be easily trained
to engage in the type of thought processes most desirable
during the jury deliberation process. Moreover, despite the
current popular notions that jurors are sponges that
uncritically absorb "junk science," especially when that science
assists plaintiffs suing doctors or corporations,22 this article
cites a variety of studies that suggest the contrary. Jurors
actually pay attention to expert evidence, evaluate it more or
less on the terms that the system expects, and take seriously
both cross-examination of experts and disagreement among
experts for the various parties. Among the kinds of
considerations that jurors discuss in post-trial interviews are
the credentials, impartiality, reasoning and factual familiarity
of the expert.' However, the article also discusses other studies
that show jurors to be less competent in evaluating expert
evidence when a case gets very complicated. The authors
21 See, e.g., Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of
Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1996). See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, Complex Litigation
at the Millennium: Kumho and How We Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 373 (2001)
(applying this observation to the legal system). For interesting work showing how hard
it is to dislodge jurors' prior conceptions of particular offenses, see Vicki L. Smith,
When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 507 (1993).
22 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991).
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BRooK L. REV. 1121, 114546 (2001).
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suggest tailoring the presentation of expert testimony to the
types of analyses that jurors are most likely to grasp, based on
a series of empirical studies that are discussed. This again
identifies a rich area for future research.
Vidmar and Diamond present reasons for being
optimistic about the future of the jury, while remaining
realistic about its shortcomings, especially in complex cases.
Their work suggests that the question is not whether the jury
works or does not work. Their lesson is that the jury works best
when it asks people to do those things that they do best. This is
an important lesson, and should be a guiding principle of
efforts to reform the jury system generally. It also creates an
important transition to the third and fourth panels of the
symposium, where most of the speakers, including a number of
academics and two federal judges, expressed their respect for
juries, and their confidence that the system is worth carrying
into the twenty-first century.
The third panel was entitled "The Law's Quest for
Impartiality: Juror Selection and Juror Nullification." Studies
and analysis about how jurors make decisions, the subject
addiessed by the first and second panels, can also provide
much needed information on what is likely to cause jurors to
make biased decisions, or decisions that are simply
inconsistent with the existing law as it has been explained to
them in instructions. With such information, the law might be
better able to identify in advance those prospective jurors
whose decision making is likely to be distorted by bias. On this
issue, as well as the issues of how to define bias and how to
evaluate the quest for impartial jurors,24 the law has much to
learn, particularly from psychologists.
The self-proclaimed objective of jury selection is to
cull what the law deems to be an "impartial" jury by posing
questions that will weed out all prospective jurors who might
be biased, unwilling, or unable to follow the dictates of the law.
Many scholars have questioned whether the attempt to locate
and eliminate biased jurors is futile.' The law itself has shown
24 See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by
Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201
(1992).
See, e.g., Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J.
405 (1995) (arguing that our concept of juror "impartiality" is based on an outmoded
[Vol. 66: 4
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considerable ambivalence about whether the ideal of the
impartial juror has much of a connection with real jurors'
cognitive processes. In a series of cases requiring that jury
pools represent a fair cross-section of the community, the
Supreme Court has recognized that members of different
communities will bring different perspectives to jury
deliberations.26 On the one hand, women, for example,
represent a distinctive group in the community and must for
that reason be fairly represented in jury pools.27 But on the
other hand, women may not be subjected to peremptory
challenges based on an assumption that they may see the facts
of a case differently because of their gender.28 The Court has
applied the same two-faced theory to race and ethnicity-it is
an affirmative value to have jury pools comprising people of
different races and ethnicities, 29 but no prospective juror may
be challenged on the basis that these characteristics might
affect their decision-making process." Gender, race, and
ethnicity both do and do not matter in legal terms.
A particularly intriguing example of the Supreme
Court's attempt to apply its own concept of what "impartiality"
means is the case of Hernandez v. New York.3 In Hernandez,
the prosecution was permitted to use peremptory challenges to
eliminate prospective jurors who were bilingual in English and
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing racism,
or bias, as a deeper and more pervasive phenomenon than the meaning we would
customarily assign the word "racist" would imply).
2' See James H. Druff, Comment, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury
Impartiality, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1555, 1559-69 (1985).
27 See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946) (a "distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded"); see generally Carol Weisbrod, Images of the
Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986).
28 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). But see id. at 146, 148-
51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (deploring the fact that after the Court's decision, a
female defendant charged with killing her male abuser would not be permitted to favor
selection of women jurors who, according to studies cited, would be more likely to be
sympathetic to her plight). See also Nancy Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (1995).
29 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (stating that Mexican-
Americans constitute a distinctive group in the community). As early as the case of
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the Supreme Court held that Strauder,
a black man, was denied equal protection of the laws because his racial peers were
excluded from service on the jury.
30 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
31 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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Spanish on the ground that these jurors might have
independently translated some trial exhibits and testimony
from the original Spanish, instead of following the official court
translation. These jurors, the Court thought, would have a
special advantage that could properly be found to provide a
race neutral explanation for the exercise of peremptory
challenges against them, despite the fact that this holding
could lead to the prospect of bilingual jurors generally being
more subject to exclusion from juries.32
Law professor Marina Hsieh, in a paper she presented
as part of this panel, "Language-Qualifying" Juries to Exclude
Bilingual Speakers, examines the reality of the bi- or multi-
lingual courtroom today. Addressing the problem the Court
considered in Hernandez, whether a prospective juror's
bilingualism could become a basis for exclusion from the jury,
she concludes that the Court's law-bound opinion in Hernandez
is irrational, does not serve truth-seeking functions, and
certainly does not address the underlying problem of
inaccuracy in official translation. If people who speak more
than one language are likely to be deemed not "impartial"
enough to serve as jurors in cases where testimony or
documents must be translated from an additional language,
then the legal concept of "impartiality" will correlate with
jurors who speak only English, and will itself be partial. Yet,
the Supreme Court has simply assumed that the ideal juror
speaks English and only English.
The legal problem of exclusion of bilingual jurors was
the center of legal attention in the Supreme Court. But other
problems Hsieh describes concerning the conduct of bi- and
multi-lingual trials go beyond the issue that found its way to
the Supreme Court, and demonstrate how myopic the Court's
view has been. Translation issues, not considered to be legal
problems, also serve to limit or distort the role of people who
32 See Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfrachisement of
Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761 (arguing that psycho-
linguistic evidence establishes a direct connection between bilingualism and the
challenged jurors' responses, and predicting that permitting exclusion on the ground
sanctioned in Hernandez will lead to a dramatic exclusion of Latino jurors. The jurors
had initially acknowledged that they might have done their own translating, an
admission that would have given rise to a challenge for cause. After further
questioning and education, they agreed to follow the official translation.).
[Vol. 66: 4
INTRODUCTION
speak languages other than English who find themselves
serving as jurors, or witnesses, or parties. If official translators
do not accurately translate the testimony or documents
presented to juries, then the notion of equal justice for all is a
myth, regardless of what language the jurors themselves
speak. The equality of the surviving jurors in Hernandez may
have been an equality of misinformation. Linguistics studies of
instructions and other communications with jurors are
generally confined to analyzing the original English versions,
and do not consider the changes that translation, even when it
is accurate, brings to the meaning and context of what jurors
are being told, and to what they understand. Hsieh also
identifies avenues of additional research that would be
necessary to evaluate both the viability of the Hernandez
Court's fears of jurors abusing their linguistic ability and the
consequences of refusing to accommodate bilingual jurors.
The law is also aware that even those "impartial"
jurors who pass through the jury selection process will not
always be wholly impartial in applying the law as instructed
by the presiding judge (or, as members of the symposium's
second panel might caution, what the jurors understand to be
their instructions). The jury's ability to nullify the law has
been, historically, one of the central arguments for the jury's
existence. For example, it is considered double jeopardy to
allow the government to appeal an acquittal in a criminal
case33 because the jury may decide to acquit even in the face of
more than sufficient evidence of guilt.34 Mythic tales of colonial
juries refusing to apply unpopular laws to popular defendants
include the jury that acquitted newsman John Peter Zenger on
a charge of libeling a colonial governor, in the face of a very
clear judicial instruction that the truth of what Zenger printed
was not a defense in the action.35 The jurors' power to nullify
the law has been established ever since an attempt to punish a
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
34 See Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:
Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001
(1980) (arguing that one of the central purposes of the double jeopardy ban on retrials
following acquittal is to protect the jury's prerogative to acquit against the evidence).
See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER (1736).
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juror who voted to acquit William Penn, for allegedly acting
against the weight of the law and the evidence, was held to be
improper.36  Jurors cannot be punished for disobeying
instructions and so, as a practical matter, they have the power
to disregard instructions. But, according to the law, jurors do
not have the "right" to nullify the law. In one well-known and
frequently studied case, United States v. Dougherty, the
scholarly judges of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that instructing jurors of their power to
nullify the law would lead to chaos and therefore should not be
done.
But what does the law mean by chaos and what do we
really know about how often jurors might use their power of
nullification if they were instructed as to its existence? These
questions are asked by psychologist Norbert L. Kerr, who
presented a paper co-authored by Irwin A. Horowitz and Keith
E. Niedermeier, entitled Jury Nullification: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives. This paper first explores our
definition of jury nullification and canvases briefly the history
of jury nullification in this country, before going on to
summarize the empirical research done by psychologists
(including the authors) that could and should inform judicial
decisions like that in Dougherty. These studies explore how
frequently conventional jury nullification occurs, to what
extent nullification is engendered by juror bias, and what the
results might be if jurors were advised of their nullification
power. The results of some of the studies-both studies of
actual juries and of simulations-are dramatic and suggestive.
A study in one jurisdiction, according to Kerr and his co-
authors, showed that only five percent of jurors were
independently aware of their power of nullification. Other
studies suggested that jurors are more likely to nullify the law
in order to bring law into harmony with their own (and their
community's) idea of distributive justice. This might happen in
a criminal case with particularly harsh penalties or in a civil
case where jurors were asked to apply what they perceived to
be unfair negligence laws. Like Hsieh, these authors conclude
' Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
37 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417
F.2d 1102, 1109 (4th Cir. 1969)).
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by listing open empirical questions where further study could
be a useful catalyst to the law.
Judge Andre M. Davis of the United States District
Court in Maryland, adding a perspective from the federal
bench, spoke as an advocate of the jury (and a former juror
himself). His commentary discusses Justice Thurgood
Marshall's recommendation that jury selection would be
enhanced by the abolition of peremptory challenges. "Selection"
of jurors inevitably introduces an element of partiality into
what would otherwise be a more random process. Rather than
attempting to refine the peremptory challenge process, Judge
Davis agrees with Justice Marshall that abolition might be a
better approach. He also adds some practical wisdom on the
question of jurors' use of their nullification powers, and a
welcome perspective on the extent to which juries, over the
years, have earned his respect. Law professor Akhil Amar also
spoke on this panel, elaborating on ideas set forth in his earlier
published work. Amar has responded to calls for abolition of
the jury, particularly the strident reactions following the O.J.
Simpson verdict, by advocating instead some fairly dramatic
reforms of the jury system.8 Part of his campaign is designed
to bring the jury of the twenty-first century back to the past-
to what he argues was the framers' original robust conception
of the jury's role."
Amar's comments set the stage for the fourth panel,
"The Jury in the Twenty-First Century," where panelists
discussed how juries in the next century, or indeed the next
millennium, might or should function. Nancy S. Marder, a law
professor and frequent author on jury-related topics, agreed
with Amar that the goal for the future should be to empower
juries. Consistent with the theme of the conference, she also
looked beyond the legal world for ideas that could reshape the
role and functioning of the jury-to technology. Her paper,
Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First
Century, published in this issue, argues that the medieval jury
was far more active than the modern jury, but that lawyers
Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1169 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Unlocking the
Jury Box, 77 POL'Y REV. (May-June 1996).3 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J.
1131 (1991).
20011
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
and judges took control40 and left the modern juror in the
purely passive posture of a sponge.4 She advocates the use of
technology in many forms to restore jurors to a more active
role. Her suggestions range from the very modest (paper and
pencil to take notes) to the sophisticated and controversial
(juror use of computers). Her paper examines ways in which
technology might be useful before jurors ever arrive in the
courthouse (using web sites for orientation, allowing
prospective jurors to check in without appearing at the
courthouse if an appearance is unnecessary), in the courtroom
itself (using videotapes of expert testimony that jurors could
review during their deliberations, for example), and post-
verdict (use of a web site or even a simple postcard to inform
the jurors of further results in a case on which they sat-like a
criminal defendant's sentence).
Marder's proposals are followed by a discussion of the
possible objections, including cost, tradition, and the impact
these. varying technologies might actually have on juries. As
Marder anticipated, some of her proposals are controversial.
Another panelist, law professor Nancy King, a frequent student
of the jury,42 demonstrated in her presentation how jurors could
take an entire trial transcript with them into the jury room on
computer and search it for particular references or pieces of
testimony. This sparked a discussion of whether the disparate
technical abilities of jurors would create an imbalance of power
between the technically adept and those less adept. Technology
may present reasons to abandon a tradition-jurors could not
previously have obtained a trial transcript in time for
deliberations, but this is now possible-and thereby require a
more sophisticated analysis of whether the traditional
procedure was grounded in reason or just in technical
disability. In her paper, Marder also shares with Tiersma the
40 Jeffrey Abramson, in his book, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994), argues that the contraction of jury power in recent
centuries has coincided with the increasing democratization of the jury.
41 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994).
42 See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America,
1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673 (1996); Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case
for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123
(1996); Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Comtemporary
Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707 (1993).
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perception that identifying desirable changes will not likely
lead to adoption of those changes if there is no one to champion
change, or if the courts fall prey to inertia and continue even
those traditions that are demonstrably ineffective or outmoded.
Not all the panelists were persuaded that empowering
the jury of the future and enhancing its role was the most
desirable approach. On the one hand, constitutional scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky spoke eloquently of the role of the jury as
a symbol of democracy, and Judge Louis Pollak, of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
agreed with Judge Davis's favorable assessment of juries'
competence. On the other hand, Professor Albert Alschuler,
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School and
Visiting Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School for the
semester, ended the day by sounding a more skeptical note.
Indeed, the acquittal of O.J. Simpson continues to reverberate
and to raise questions about the efficacy of the jury system.
Reading the papers published in this symposium
issue will give readers the flavor of the debates at the live
portion of the symposium, and provide much grist for
considering not only a multi-disciplinary view of the jury, but a
challenging view of the law itself. How does law change? When
can or will the law change in response to new thinking from
outside the legal field? When are desirable changes blocked
and why? When does law do well to simply follow its traditions,
and when should it accept the invitation to look around, look
ahead, and adapt to the future?
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